University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 81

Issue 4

Article 2

September 2013

Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading
Threshold to Class Actions
Matthew JB Lawrence
matthewjblawrence@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Matthew JB Lawrence, Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshold to Class
Actions, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2013)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Lawrence: Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshol

COURTS SHOULD APPLY A RELATIVELY MORE STRINGENT
PLEADING THRESHOLD TO CLASS ACTIONS
Matthew J.B. Lawrence∗

Policymakers from Senator Edward Kennedy to Civil Rules Advisory
Committee Reporter Edward Cooper have proposed that class actions
be subject to a more stringent pleading threshold than individually-filed
suits, yet the question has not been fully explored in legal scholarship.
This Article addresses that gap. It shows that courts following the
guidance of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly should apply a relatively more
stringent pleading threshold to class actions, and a relatively less
stringent threshold to individually-filed suits.
This contribution is set forth in two steps. First, this Article explains
that, all else being equal, the anticipated systems’ costs and benefits of
allowing a lawsuit brought via the class action mechanism past the
pleading stage differ categorically from the costs and benefits of
allowing through an individually-filed suit. That is because a suit that
comes to court via a class action circumvents a gate-keeping mechanism
that is both prior to and more important than pleading: the potential
litigant’s decision whether to sue. Second, this Article points to the
history of Twombly, the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous pleading
decisions, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to show that courts
should subject damages class actions to a relatively more stringent
pleading threshold in light of the different mix of costs and benefits they
pose.
In addition to exploring in depth whether class actions should be subject
to a different threshold, this Article briefly discusses two other areas
where it may be appropriate to adjust the stringency of the pleading
threshold based upon procedural context. Specifically, it suggests that
the stringency of the pleading threshold should depend upon whether a
case is brought pro se and whether it seeks review of agency action on
the administrative record.
∗ Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Federal Programs Branch. A.B., Brown
University, 2002; J.D., New York University School of Law 2009. The views expressed herein do not
reflect the position of the United States Department of Justice. The author wishes to thank Nicholas
Almenderes, Heidi R. Altman, Patrick Garlinger, Mark Geistfeld, Samuel Issacharoff, Drew JohnsonSkinner, David Lawrence, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Arthur R. Miller, Margot Pollans, Rebecca
Stone, the Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, and Joshua D. Wright for comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and the editors of the University of Cincinnati Law Review, including B. Nathaniel Garrett and
Gregory Kendall. Finally, I am grateful for the continuing encouragement and support of Arminda
Lawrence.

1225

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

1226

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

I. Introduction..................................................................................... 1227
II. A Framework for Calibrating the Stringency of the Pleading
Threshold ................................................................................. 1232
A. The Costs and Benefits of Letting Suits into Court ............ 1234
1. The Costs of Letting Suits In................................... 1234
2. The Benefits of Letting Suits In .............................. 1235
B. Which Case Facts Should Affect the Stringency of the
Pleading Threshold? ........................................................... 1238
III. Pleading Class Actions................................................................. 1239
A. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of Letting a
Suit into Court .................................................................... 1241
1. A Categorical Effect of Class Treatment ................ 1241
2. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of
Pleading................................................................. 1244
a. Outcome-independent Costs ............................. 1244
b. Outcome-dependent Costs ................................ 1246
c. Outcome-dependent Benefits ............................ 1247
d. Outcome-independent Benefits ......................... 1248
B. The Pleading Threshold for Class Actions Should Be
Different ............................................................................. 1249
1. Policy Recommendation: A Different Pleading
Threshold .............................................................. 1249
2. Rule 8 Recommendation: A More Stringent
Pleading Rule ........................................................ 1250
a. Twombly’s Procedural History Indicates the
Supreme Court Considered its Class Status.... 1251
b. The Supreme Court’s Contemporaneous
Decisions Indicate a More Stringent
Threshold for Class Actions ........................... 1253
c. Advancement of Substantive Law is an
Inappropriate Consideration in Interpreting
Rule 8 .............................................................. 1254
d. Calibrating the stringency of the pleading
standard based on context is not
unprecedented ................................................. 1256
IV. Other Candidates for Special Treatment ...................................... 1258
A. Pro Se Actions Are Already Subject to a Less Stringent
Threshold............................................................................ 1258
B. Record Review Actions Should Be Subject to a Less
Stringent Threshold ............................................................ 1259
V. Conclusion..................................................................................... 1259

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/2

2

Lawrence: Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshol

2013]

MORE STRINGENT PLEADINGS FOR CLASS ACTIONS

1227

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced “A Bill to Revise Class
Damage Procedures”1 which, among other things, would have imposed
a special pleading requirement for class actions more stringent than the
rule applicable to individually-filed suits. The bill originated in the
Department of Justice and was a response to the perceived revolution in
civil litigation brought about by the creation of the opt-out damages
class action reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
Although it received significant scholarly attention,2 the bill was
ultimately unsuccessful. Still, the idea has never completely gone away;
in 1998 Edward Cooper noted the possibility of “requiring more
particularized pleading in class actions than in other litigation.”3
In 1995, as part of incoming Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s
“Contract with America,” Republicans in Congress introduced the
“Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (PSLRA).4 Among other
things, the PSLRA required that federal private securities lawsuits plead
mens rea with particularity.5 This change was in large part a response to
the perceived abuse and waste caused by securities class actions brought
pursuant to Federal Rule 23.6 The Act became law over President Bill
Clinton’s veto, helped in part by the vote of Senator Edward Kennedy.7
1. S. 3475, 95th Cong., § 3006 (1978).
2. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 682–93 (1978); see also George B. Mickum, III &
Carol A. Rhees, Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to the Proposed Legislation, 69 KY. L.J. 799
(1980); Dennis J. Block & Irwin H. Warren, New Battles in the “Class Struggle”—The Federal Courts
Reexamine the Securities Class Action, 34 BUS. LAW. 455 (1978).
3. Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 962 (1998).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
5. Id. at 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2013)) (“[T]he complaint shall, with respect
to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”).
6. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1796.1 (3d ed. 2012) (cost of discovery in class
actions was “the primary rationale” for provisions in the PSLRA mandating discovery be stayed pending
resolution of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the merits); Stephen J. Choi, Drew T.
Johnson Skinner, & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. Emp. L.
Stud. 650, 651 (2011) (PSLRA was intended in large part to address perceived abuses in securities class
actions); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
421, 431 (2009) (particularity pleading requirement in PSLRA was intended by Congress to curb what it
perceived to be “the frequency of baseless securities class actions that were being filed to extort
recoveries as a consequence of lax procedural protections of defendants”); Patrick E. Longan, Congress,
the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 645–46 (1997) (describing development
of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial
and Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
1003, 1023 (1998) (PSLRA was “designed to prevent abuses of federal securities class action lawsuits”).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 78u-5
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In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8
in which the Court held that a complaint seeking to bring a massive
damages class action on behalf of millions of telephone service
subscribers should be dismissed because it did not present a “plausible”
claim for relief.9 The Court explained its decision preventing the suit
(or, rather, millions of suits) from proceeding was necessary to combat
the problem of “abuse” in civil litigation, though it did not elaborate at
any length on that concept. This lead to conjecture that the new
“plausibility” requirement was limited to Twombly’s case type: an
antitrust class action.10 But that conjecture was rejected in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,11 when the Court explained that the plausibility standard must be
met by any Plaintiff hoping to bring a civil action in federal court.12 The
two cases have sparked a wealth of debate in the federal reporters13 and
law journals about the nature and stringency of the plausibility standard
and the so-called “pleading problem”14 some believe the standard was
intended to address.
Considered together, these three moments in the history of pleading
policy present an underlying question: Do cases brought via the class
action mechanism warrant special treatment when it comes to pleading?
In the host of post-Twombly pleading scholarship, the question has not
yet been fully explored.15 This Article addresses that gap, and answers
“yes,” class actions should get special treatment.
Answering this question of pleading policy is no simple task. In
order to evaluate whether class actions should receive special treatment
when it comes to pleading, we first need to at least sketch a conceptual
framework that can explain what the pleading rule “should” be. That
framework must be complete enough to do two things: (1) evaluate
(2006)); see also David H. Webber, Is ‘Pay-to-Play’ Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in
Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2037 (2010) (discussing passage
of PSLRA).
8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. Id. at 556.
10. See William M. Janssen, Iqbal ‘Plausibility’ in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 555–56 (2011) (discussing confusion); see also Ettie Ward, The AfterShocks of Twombly: Will We ‘Notice’ Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S. L. REV. 893 (2008) (same).
11. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
12. Id. at 684.
13. Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008).
14. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
15. Professor Moore rejects the possibility without explanation in his treatise. 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.61[1] (3d ed. 2012). Professor Effron discusses and
largely rejects the possibility in The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the
Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2029 (2010), but as explained below the
analysis therein does not account fully for several considerations that undermine its conclusion. See
infra Part III(A)(2).
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whether the expected benefits of allowing a particular case into court
outweigh the expected costs in light of the case’s particular factual
context; and (2) decide which aspects of a case (or “case facts”16) that
alter these costs and benefits, if any, the pleading rule should take into
account in a world in which information is both incomplete and costly.
After laying out such a conceptual framework, this Article applies it
in the class action context and concludes that, as a categorical matter,
class actions warrant special treatment. This is because the relative
expected costs and benefits of allowing a suit brought via the class
action past the pleading stage are different than the costs and benefits of
allowing into court a lawsuit brought via a traditional, individual action.
These differences are driven by a crucial categorical distinction between
suits brought as class actions and those filed individually: ordinary
lawsuits are subject to a gate-keeping device both antecedent to and
more important than pleading—the individual litigant’s decision to
sue—but the class action mechanism short circuits around this gatekeeping device.
Because the class action mechanism brings suits into court even when
the individual litigants did not choose to sue, purported damages class
actions pose a very different mix of costs and benefits at the pleading
stage. The expected costs of letting such a suit past the pleading stage,
be they outcome-independent (like discovery expense) or outcomedependent (like the risk of false positives), exceed the expected costs of
letting an individually-filed suit past the pleading stage. As for the
benefits, suits brought as class actions may (or may not) tend to do more
to advance the outcome-dependent benefits of letting suits in, namely,
advancing the goals of the underlying substantive law. But suits brought
to court through the class action mechanism do not do as much as
individually-filed suits to further the sometimes forgotten transaction
benefit of civil litigation, namely, the system’s interest in giving an
interested litigant his day in court to air his grievance, right or wrong.
The following is an example to illustrate the point: imagine two
entities involved in fixing (actual) broken hearts, Acme, a medical
supply company that manufactures pacemakers, and Dr. Bayer, a heart
surgeon who puts them in. Both injure, perhaps negligently, fifty
customers/patients: Acme injures fifty of the 5,000 patients implanted
with one of its pacemakers via a defect that it arguably should have
noticed and fixed,17 and Dr. Bayer injures fifty patients in the years
16. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Courts in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1 (Mark D. White ed., 2009) (modeling judicial decision making in “case space,” where
cases are described by case facts).
17. This example has as its inspiration Cohen v. Guidant Corp., an actual would-be class action
that was dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) on Feb. 15, 2011, in part for failure to plead a case
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leading up to his retirement because the onset of old age has robbed him
of his abilities but he refuses to recognize it.18
Research on malpractice suit filing rates suggests that, of the 50
patients injured during surgery performed by Dr. Bayer, perhaps six will
ask a court to declare Dr. Bayer is at fault and order compensation; the
rest will simply go on with their lives.19 When any patient does so, the
court will apply the pleading standard of Rule 8 to determine whether to
hear Patient v. Bayer and, if it does so and the patient succeeds, Dr.
Bayer (or rather his insurer) will be on the hook for that one individual’s
injury.
The same percentage of Acme’s customers may go to court, but
because Acme’s liability will be a question common to all class
members (i.e. “should Acme have spotted the defect?”), its action will
likely be susceptible to class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. There is a good chance that at least one of its injured
customers will seek to bring the suit as a class action on behalf of all 50
patients injured by the arguable defect in Acme pacemakers.
If Patient v. Acme is allowed into court as a purported class action,
Acme will face liability of a magnitude far greater than that faced by Dr.
Bayer in the few individually-filed suits that may be brought against
him. Acme will face the prospect of a single suit in which it could be
held liable for the damage done to close to 100% of the people injured
by its pacemakers, most of whom would not (for whatever reason) have
sued individually. This fact makes the expected costs and benefits of
allowing a class complaint against Acme past the pleading stage
systematically different from the expected costs and benefits of allowing
an individual suit against Dr. Bayer into court. Among other changes,
discovery costs will be relatively higher in the class action against
Acme, because Acme will have a greater incentive to fight discovery
and the burden of any search and production will be more readily
“under the Rule 8(a) standards announced” in Twombly and Iqbal. See Cohen v. Guidant Corp., No. 0508070-R, 2011 WL 637472, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011).
18. This example has as its inspiration a news report about an 82-year-old vascular surgeon in
California who was asked to surrender his medical license after a competency assessment ordered by the
Medical Board of California determined that he “had visual-spatial abnormalities, could not do fine
motor movements,” and “could not retain information.” See Laurie Tarkan, As Doctors Age, Worries
About Their Ability Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at D1 (“[E]xperts warn that there are too few
safeguards to protect patients against those who should no longer be practicing.”). The physician “did
not think he had a problem.” Id.; see also Jennifer F. Waljee et al., Surgeon Age and Operative
Mortality in the United States, 244 ANN. SURG. 353 (2006) (concluding that for certain complex
procedures, surgeons older than 60 years have statistically-significant higher mortality rates than their
younger counterparts).
19. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 tbl.4.1 (1993) (about one in eight
negligent injuries led to a legal claim); see also David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and
Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000).
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outweighed by the amount in controversy under the proportionality
production rule of Federal Rule 26(b)(2). The risk of a false positive
will be greater because Acme may be risk averse and prefer to settle
rather than face a huge all-or-nothing verdict. Finally, if Acme really
was at fault, the substantive law (here, tort) may benefit by allowing the
class suit through because a successful class action will force Acme to
compensate all of its victims rather than only those few who choose to
sue and succeed in their suit, as Dr. Bayer would have to do.20 Because
of this different mix of costs and benefits posed by class actions, the
pleading standard applicable to such suits should be different. If the
added cost of discovery and false positives outweighs any added benefit
associated with greater enforcement of the substantive law, the standard
should be more stringent. If the added cost is outweighed by any added
benefit, then the standard should be less stringent.
This Article makes two closely related contributions. Its first
contribution is to show that, for the reasons just discussed, the pleading
threshold applicable to class actions should be different than that
applicable to other suits, regardless whether that bar should be higher or
lower in the class action context. Reasonable people might disagree
about the relative weights of the costs and benefits associated with class
treatment and so may disagree about whether the rule for class actions
should be more or less strict than the rule for individually-filed suits. As
a result, it is difficult to say more by means of logical syllogism than
“the rule should be different.”
Courts do not make pleading rules by logical syllogisms, however. In
our system, courts affect pleading policy by interpreting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 and are bound to be faithful to precedent in doing so.
This fact enables the second contribution of this Article—that courts
should apply a more stringent pleading threshold to damages class
actions than individually-filed suits.
There is reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s latest effort at
pleading reform is intended to address burdens on the litigation system
that are caused disproportionately by class actions. As a result, this
Article shows that judges and justices interpreting and applying Rule 8
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instructions in Twombly should apply a
relatively more stringent pleading threshold to class actions than
individually-filed suits, all else being equal. (Indeed, this author’s
personal intuition is that the best way to address the burdens with which
Twombly was most concerned while doing the least damage to an
individual’s “day in court” may be to apply a strict pleading rule to
20. It would not be correct to say the substantive law “will” benefit because whether the
substantive law is furthered by increasing the lawsuit rate depends on ones view of the purposes of the
tort system. See infra Part II(A)(2).
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purported damages class action complaints and a notice pleading rule to
most other complaints.)
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II surveys recent pleading
case law and literature in order to develop a taxonomy of the costs and
benefits that should be considered in setting the stringency of the
pleading threshold that a complaint must clear in order to make it into
court, and also discusses what sort of case facts that influence these
costs and benefits should be reflected in the pleading rule. Part III then
applies this methodology to damages class action complaints, and shows
that the expected costs and benefits of allowing a case into court depend
categorically upon whether the suit comes at the behest of a litigant who
has decided to sue or via the class action mechanism, so that the
pleading threshold applicable to damages class action complaints should
be different than that applicable to individually-filed suits. It then
explains that courts interpreting and applying Rule 8 in a particular case
(or, in other words, applying Twombly and Iqbal) should read the rule to
require relatively more of class actions and relatively less of
individually-filed suits. Part IV discusses other potential situations
beyond class actions where the framework developed in Part II suggests
a more or less stringent pleading threshold is warranted, or at least
should be considered. Finally, a brief conclusion is offered.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR CALIBRATING THE STRINGENCY OF THE PLEADING
THRESHOLD
For decades most scholars and judges believed that anyone who
wanted to bring a federal civil claim in federal court would be permitted
to do so.21 So long as a would-be plaintiff came to court bearing a
complaint that gave notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claim for
relief and the grounds therefore—so that the defendant could prepare a
defense—the courthouse doors would be open.
In Twombly and then in Iqbal, the Supreme Court announced that the
pleading standard is more difficult to meet than many believed. Not just
any federal case or controversy belongs in federal court, as Justice
Souter and then Justice Kennedy explained. Rather, only complaints
that set forth a “plausible” claim to relief satisfy the pleading
requirement of Federal Rule 8.22 The jury is still out on what the
Justices meant by “plausible;” neither elaborated much, and they
21. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
22. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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themselves have publically disagreed on the meaning of the standard.23
But the would-be plaintiffs in Twombly and Iqbal can themselves attest
that the “plausibility” standard means at least that some who want to
bring federal (or diverse) cases in federal court may not do so. Pleading
no longer serves only a notice-giving function, if it ever did—now it
keeps some cases out of court altogether.
Whatever the merits of the “plausibility” standard, one benefit of
Twombly and Iqbal is that the two cases have provided the spark for a
pleading renaissance. Never before has so much judicial and scholarly
attention been paid to the pleading process by which cases come into
federal court. No approach to the issue has been overlooked.
Doctrinally, a significant and necessarily speculative effort (absent
further judicial elaboration) is underway to understand exactly how the
standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal works.24 Empirically, a
number of scholars have investigated how the “plausibility” standard is
being interpreted by those who are best suited to understand the
operation of the Federal Rules—federal judges.25
Theoretically, and of most immediate importance to this Article,
scholars have paid renewed attention to the role that access to court
plays in federal civil litigation in an effort to better understand pleading
policy and the tradeoffs at play in establishing a pleading standard. If
courts applying Rule 8 are to play Saint Peter and the courthouse doors
are to be the pearly gates, then we need a theory of which lawsuits
should be allowed through and which should be rejected.
This Part builds upon existing literature to survey the costs and
benefits relevant to the decision of whether a case should be allowed
into court, and then addresses which case facts that influence these costs
and benefits the pleading rule should take into account. In other words,
this Part lays out a framework that can be used in evaluating questions
of pleading policy. The framework here is articulated in terms of costs
and benefits in order to enable a weighing for purposes of
policymaking.26
The framework described in this Part sets the stage for the analysis in

23. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
24. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); see David Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J.
117 (2010).
25. E.g., Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Patricia Hatamyar, The Tao of
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Hannon, supra
note 13, at 1811.
26. For an alternative but related framework articulated in terms of discrete goals rather than
costs and benefits, see Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 6 FLA. L. REV. 845 (2012).
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Part III of how the class action mechanism changes the pleading
calculus, and the suggestion that, if Rule 8 must be read to include a
gate-keeping pleading requirement as indicated in Twombly and Iqbal,
that requirement should be relatively more stringent for suits brought as
class actions and relatively less stringent for suits people actually decide
to bring, all else being equal.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Letting Suits into Court
That setting the bar for cases to be allowed into court requires a
“balance” has been widely recognized.27 It is equally well-known that
the costs of discovery and risk of in terrorem settlements in speculative
cases weigh in favor of a more stringent pleading standard that will keep
more cases out of court.28 There is much less agreement, however,
about the benefits that weigh in favor of letting lawsuits into court.
These two sides of the “pleading equation,”29 are discussed below in
turn.
1. The Costs of Letting Suits In
The costs of letting a suit into court can be subdivided into two
categories: (1) outcome-independent costs, like money spent on
discovery, and (2) outcome-dependent costs, like false positives that
result when a defendant settles a speculative suit simply to avoid the
unlikely risk of a losing judgment. As for the former, in addition to
discovery costs, outcome-independent costs most apparently include
attorneys’ fees, the court’s time, and the cost to either party of releasing
sensitive private information through litigation. In economic terms,
these can all be thought of as the transaction costs of civil litigation.
Turning to outcome-dependent costs, these include the false positive
discussed above, those costs imposed on innocent defendants who, for
one reason or another, through settlement or a losing judgment, come to
bear some liability. (Liability borne by a guilty defendant may be seen
as a cost to that defendant, but this Article lists it as a system benefit of
letting suits in below.)
The Supreme Court noted both sorts of costs in Twombly (though not
in so many words). Avoidance of discovery cost was a refrain
throughout the court’s opinion. And regarding false positives, the Court
quoted with approval the statement in Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Broudo that a complaint must support more than the mere possibility of
27. E.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
28. Id.
29. See generally Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009).
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liability “lest a plaintiff ‘with a largely groundless claim be allowed to
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.’”30
2. The Benefits of Letting Suits In
Much less attention has been paid to the other side of the pleading
equation—the benefits of letting lawsuits into court.31 The Supreme
Court in Twombly and Iqbal offered no guidance; it did not even hint at
what countervailing considerations make lawsuits worthwhile, instead
taking what Arthur Miller has called a “telescopic focus on the burdens”
of litigation.32 But it is impossible to talk of the appropriate pleading
standard without identifying the benefits of letting lawsuits into court in
addition to the costs.33
The most readily apparent benefit of letting lawsuits into court, and
the most prominent in the literature, is that the imposition of liability on
a guilty defendant advances the substantive law that forms the basis for
the cause of action.34 A damages award against a party that has in fact
violated a law (in theory) deters further violations of that law, often
compensates the person who suffered a legal injury, and can serve the
purpose of retribution.
Some scholars that have modeled pleading and the goals of civil
procedure assume, without saying so, that this outcome-dependent
benefit, enforcement of substantive law, is the only benefit to
litigation.35 For example, in his analysis of Twombly Professor Epstein
concluded that “standard expected utility calculations suggest that
litigation should be allowed to go forward only when the likelihood of a
positive case is high enough to justify . . . the enormous costs of

30. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (citing Dura Pharm. Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347(2005)).
31. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 66 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the empirical work done so far on the
expense of litigation, including the submissions to the Duke Conference, only explores one side of the
cost–benefit equation.”).
32. Id. at 71.
33. Id. (“Given the current state of procedural flux and its direction, a wide-angle evaluation of
the pretrial process must replace today’s telescopic focus on the burdens on defendants. That seems a
necessary precursor for developing balanced and workable solutions.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765, 768 (2010)
(“Without a normative standard, it is impossible to say, in any meaningful way, that litigation is too
expensive.”).
34. E.g., Bone, supra note 24, at 849.
35. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

1236

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

discovery in class action antitrust suits.”36 Professor Epstein did not
explain from whence he had derived the implicit view of the utility
function of the civil justice system that underlies this statement. On this
view, it should be noted, there is never any value in allowing a meritless
suit (one brought against a party who has not in fact violated the law)
into court.
However, courts, politicians, and other scholars have identified a
second sort of benefit of litigation that is outcome-independent.
Namely, in the eyes of many, giving a person who has been injured his
day in court is itself a system value, even if the court winds up deciding
(correctly) that the target of his lawsuit bears no fault. As Benjamin
Spencer has explained, “[a]ccess to justice is a cornerstone principle of
our democracy. Vital to that principle is our civil justice system and the
ease with which those who have been aggrieved are able to seek relief
from the federal courts.”37 As shorthand, this Article refers to this as the
access value.38
This access value is furthered regardless of whether a lawsuit, once
brought, leads to a judgment against a guilty party.39 The system
benefits even when a losing suit is brought and loses, because the “sharp
clash of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic
setting” is fundamental to resolving a dispute in a way that is acceptable
not only to the winner, but to the loser.40
In economic terms, while civil litigation certainly has outcomeindependent transaction costs, it has outcome-independent transaction
benefits, too. In terms of our recurring example, some would say the
system benefits when a patient who feels he (or a loved one) was
wronged by Acme (or Dr. Bayer) gets the opportunity to have his
grievance considered by a neutral judge, even if the court ultimately
concludes that Acme (or Dr. Bayer) did nothing wrong.41
Professor Arthur Miller has been a passionate and tireless advocate of
36. Id. at 81.
37. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L REV. 1, 2 (2009).
38. It might also be called the rule of law value.
39. Cf. Spencer, supra note 37, at 23 (“The second and equally important sense of the term
justice refers to the value of procedural fairness, meaning that the procedure established to resolve a
dispute permits the aggrieved and the accused to participate in the proceedings and have their claims and
defenses heard and resolved in a fair manner. Processes that promote litigant access, permit the
discovery of supporting evidence, and call for resolution by an impartial decisionmaker can be viewed
as procedurally just regardless of the accuracy of the result.”).
40. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 2 (1988).
41. Cf. Joan Savitsky, MD., A Patient Dies, and Then the Anguish of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2009, at D 5 (describing children of a deceased patient, “whom I barely knew, were coping
with their own complex emotions, which I imagined to be grief, very likely anger and frustration, and
perhaps misunderstanding. Filing a malpractice suit somehow addressed this”).
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the access value. In his Article lamenting what he perceives to be the
access value’s declining salience among those who set the rules of
procedure, he asked, “after Twombly and Iqbal, is our American court
system still one in which an aggrieved person, however unsophisticated
and under-resourced he may be, can secure a meaningful day in
court?”42 In his view, Twombly and Iqbal overlooked the access value,
subordinating it “to one-dimensional claims of excessive litigation costs
and abuse that have not been validated.”43 As one Court put it, our
“system [is] becoming increasingly inaccessible to the average
citizen.”44 By so doing, in Professor Miller’s view, policymakers have
“overlooked . . . that the modes of civil procedure are the mechanisms
for operating an important societal regulatory system.”45
Professor Miller is not alone; after Iqbal, a House Subcommittee held
a hearing titled “Access to Justice Denied,” considering the
ramifications of Twombly and Iqbal and possible legislative responses to
the cases.46 As Benjamin Spencer notes,47 courts have recognized the
right of court access as a fundamental value of civil litigation: “The right
to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies
at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and
most essential privileges of citizenship.”48 The value was recognized as
early as Marbury: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives injury.”49 Indeed, a limited right of court access is
constitutionality-mandated by the First Amendment.50
Of course, unlike discovery cost, the value of court access is hard—
perhaps impossible—to quantify.51 More could certainly be said about
42. Miller, supra note 31, at 2; see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 987–88 (2003) (expressing concern for erosion of access
to courts).
43. Miller, supra note 31, at 2.
44. Scheetz ex rel. Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628, 630 n.2 (D. Mont.
1993) (quoting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (1992)).
45. Miller, supra note 31, at 71–72.
46. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
47. Spencer, supra note 37, at 27 n.124.
48. Id. (citing Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)).
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
50. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (“[T]he right of access to the
courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”).
51. See Spencer, supra note 37, at 24 (“Neither can we know with any certainty the degree to
which premature dismissals of invalid claims undermine the public’s sense of the system’s procedural
fairness and how that may impact its perceived legitimacy.”).
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the access value, not to mention the other costs and benefits of lawsuits.
But a fuller exposition is not necessary for, and therefore beyond the
scope of, this Article.
B. Which Case Facts Should Affect the Stringency of the Pleading
Threshold?
In a world of perfect and costless information, the optimal pleading
rule would simply take into account all case facts that affect the costs
and benefits of letting a suit into court. But we do not live in such a
world, and so the question of which case facts the pleading rule should
take into account is more complicated. Courts have limited information
about the cases in front of them, especially at the pleading stage. As a
result, identification of the facts about a case and determination of their
influence on the system costs and benefits of letting the suit into court
can be a costly endeavor in itself, and the cost of this endeavor might
well outweigh the benefits of a finely-tailored rule.
In order to identify exactly which case facts should be taken into
account and when, one would need detailed empirical data, or, absent
that, years of experience with various case types, such that it would be
possible to estimate the likely cost of identifying whether a particular
case fact is present in a case and compare that estimated cost to the
estimated benefit of screening more (or less) strictly cases that include
that fact. As this author has neither the data nor the experience to
evaluate precisely which case facts the pleading rule ought to take into
account, doing so is a task beyond the scope of this Article.
It is possible to say without such detailed data, however, that the
pleading rule should take into account case facts that (1) are present on
the face of the complaint, and (2) categorically affect the expected
system costs and benefits of letting the case into court. Such facts can
be identified without costly fact-finding or dispute between the parties.
Under Twombly and Iqbal, the court already takes into account one
such case fact that is present on the face of the complaint and affects the
system costs and benefits of the case. Specifically, the court considers
whether the facts alleged in the complaint rise to the level of
“plausibility.” The preceding framework certainly suggests this aspect
of a case should be considered in deciding whether the case should be
allowed into court (assuming that pleading must serve some screening
function, as it now must under Twombly and Iqbal). The allegations of a
complaint are of course present on its face. As for the categorical
system costs and benefits of letting a case into court, to the extent that
“plausibility” correlates with likelihood of success, it certainly affects
system costs and benefits. Both the estimated outcome-dependent costs
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(like false positives) and the estimated outcome-dependent benefits (like
advancement of substantive law) of letting a case into court depend on
an obvious way upon the estimated likelihood that the case will be a
winner.
As discussed in the next Part, the costs and benefits of letting a case
into court also depend to a significant degree upon the mechanism by
which a suit comes to court. Specifically, damages suits that come as
class actions and individually-filed suits pose a very different mix of
expected benefits and burdens. As a result, the pleading standard for
these two types of cases should be different.
III. PLEADING CLASS ACTIONS
After a brief background of the rule that governs damages class
actions, Federal Rule 23(b)(3), Part A below explores how class
treatment under the rule categorically alters the costs and benefits of
allowing a suit into court. Part B then makes a recommendation based
upon that analysis: the pleading rule applicable to class actions should
be different, and for purposes of courts faithfully applying the teachings
of Twombly in interpreting Federal Rule 8, it should be more stringent.
In the federal system, the courts themselves have broad authority to
issue rules that govern their own internal procedures. Via the Rules
Enabling Act (REA), Congress delegated to the federal courts power to
issue rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.”52 Under the authority granted by the REA, the courts have
adopted a variety of rules codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governing the process by which lawsuits are brought,
including a general rule governing pleading, Federal Rule 8.53
One of the most controversial rules adopted by the federal courts
through their Rules Enabling Act power is Rule 23, the rule providing
for class actions. Under this rule, a judge can allow a plaintiff to sue not
just on behalf of himself, but also on behalf of all similarly-situated
persons who arguably were harmed in the same way by the same
defendant. Through this mechanism, a person’s lawsuit can be brought
in federal court and he can win or lose, all without ever being aware that
he had a case.
In order for a suit seeking money damages to proceed in this manner
under Rule 23(b)(3), the judge must find that the various cases that
would be brought via the class action are sufficiently similar to be
susceptible to class treatment and that the lead plaintiff—who wants to

52. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

1240

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

bring other potential plaintiffs’ suits for them—is fit to serve that role.
This is done using a five-part test, pursuant to which the judge must
conclude: (1) the class is so numerous as to make joinder of all members
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
that predominate over any individual questions, (3) the claims of the
lead plaintiff or plaintiffs are typical of the claims of absent class
members, (4) class treatment would be superior to other available
methods for fair and efficient adjudication, and (5) the lead plaintiff or
plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members.
As the Rules Advisory Committee has stated and the Supreme Court
echoed (or trumpeted), the rule facilitates the vindication of the “rights
of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents to court at all” because their claims
would lead to recoveries too small to be individually profitable.54 As
stated, “[a] class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.”55 This is because, while each plaintiff whose lawsuit
is brought as a class action receives only their share of any judgment,
the single lawyer who litigated all their suits receives a proportionate
chunk of the aggregated judgment.
Neither the Rules Advisory Committee nor commentators expected
the dramatic changes that the new class action rule would work on mass
tort, securities, and other types of litigation, especially in positive-value
cases (cases in which the potential benefit of suit already outweighs the
cost). Indeed, the Advisory Committee stated, in issuing the rule, that a
“‘mass accident’” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
“‘ordinarily not appropriate’ for class treatment . . . .”56 The rule lay
relatively dormant in the field of high-value claims until the Dalkon
Shield case, when it first began being used for mass torts and products
liability actions. Once the rule’s power had been demonstrated,
however, use of the device became ever more “adventuresome.”57 Ever
since, it has been looked upon as civil litigation’s Frankenstein monster
or shining knight, depending upon who you talk to.58

54. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A
Prepatory Note, 10 B.C.L. REV. 497 (1969)).
55. Id. (citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp. 109 F.3d. 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
56. Id. at 625.
57. Id. at 617.
58. See Miller, supra note 2, at 682–93.
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A. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of Letting a Suit into
Court
The class action device has been at the center of numerous efforts at
pleading reform,59 successful and not, including Twombly itself. It is
surprising, therefore, that the implications of the class action device for
pleading have received scant attention in the torrent of recent pleading
scholarship. This Part addresses that void by applying the framework
developed in the last Part to evaluate whether and how the fact that a
suit comes to court via a class action categorically alters the four types
of pleading policy costs and benefits discussed in Part III: outcomedependent costs, outcome-independent costs, outcome-dependent
benefits, and outcome-independent benefits. But before doing so, it is
necessary to discuss a categorical effect of class treatment that will
inform every step of this analysis. Class certification circumvents an
important gate-keeping mechanism that has historically kept cases out of
court even before the pleading stage: the decision to sue.
1. A Categorical Effect of Class Treatment
Although pleading is the most visible mechanism for determining
which cases come through the courthouse door, and understandably has
been the primary focus of recent court access scholarship, it is usually
not the most important. Rather, the individual litigant’s decision
whether to sue is a far more important determinant of whether a lawsuit
is brought for most potential cases. As discussed below, available
empirical research available suggests that litigant self-selection screens
out (prevents from being brought) from 50–90% of potential lawsuits.
Contrary to economic theorizing on the subject,60 people do not just
decline to sue only in cases where it would be unprofitable to litigate; we
routinely decline to bring even potentially profitable lawsuits.61 Indeed,

59. E.g., A Bill to Revise Class Damage Procedures, S. 3475, 95th Cong. § 3006 (1978); Cooper,
supra note 3, at 962.
60. E.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 173 (1990); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
437 (1988).
61. Some studies of when people decide to sue have found support for the “fault and equity
approach.” This theory explains lawsuits as arising when people believe “that someone else is at fault
and a successful claim for compensation can restore the justice or equity of the situation.” Faten Sabry
& Frederick C. Dunbar, The Propensity to Sue: Why Do People Seek Legal Action, 42 BUS. ECON. 31
(2007); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 443, 448 (1987)
(citing studies). For example, in one survey, those who blamed others for an accident (rather than
themselves) were more than ten times more likely to consider suing. Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to
Sue in England and the United States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J. L. SOC’Y
400 (1991).
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numerous qualitative studies of actual litigant behavior have shown that
we do not decide to sue based on purely economic motives, whatever
highly-publicized examples of American “litigiousness” might
suggest.62 Ellickson, in a study of lawsuit behavior in a rural farming
community, provides several anecdotes:
The landowners who were interviewed clearly regard their restraint in
seeking monetary relief as a mark of virtue. When asked why they did
not pursue meritorious legal claims arising from trespass or fence-finance
disputes, various landowners replied: “I’m not that kind of guy;” “I don’t
believe in it;” “I don’t like to create a stink;” “I try to get along.”‘ The
landowners who attempted to provide a rationale for this forbearance all
implied the same one, a long-term reciprocity of advantage. Ann
Kershaw: “The only one that makes money [when you litigate] is the
lawyer.”‘ Al Levy: “I figure it will balance out in the long run.” Pete
Schultz: “I hope they’ll do the same for me.”‘ Phil Ritchie: “My family
believes in ‘live and let live.’”63

Ellickson’s study is not unique.64 One study showed social pressure
against suing in a rural Illinois community, regardless of the identity of
the tortfeasor.65 Another study showed a largely Baptist opposition to
lawsuits in an Atlanta suburb.66 Yet another study, relevant to Patient v.
Bayer, showed that patients sue their doctors for potential malpractice
only a fraction of the time.67 This fraction appears to go down when the
doctor offers an apology.68 And in a very different context, Cox &
Thomas found that institutional investors with extremely high stakes
claims (averaging $90,000) file to collect on class settlements with

62. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 984, 988 (2003) (prominent litigation examples like suit against McDonalds for serving coffee too
hot are covered in the media but are not reported accurately and unrepresentative of civil litigation
generally).
63. Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 681–82 (1986).
64. For a similar qualitative approach to understanding lawsuit behavior, see, e.g., As Seen on
TV: The Normative Influence of Syndi-Court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L. J. 1 (2004). See also WEILER ET AL., supra note 19, at 70 tbl.4.1 (about one in eight negligent injuries
led to a legal claim); Abel, supra note 61.
65. David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551 (1984).
66. M. P. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL CONTROL 79, 82, 93 (Donald Black ed., 1984).
67. WEILER ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 (reporting that “our analysis of malpractice litigation
data demonstrates that the problem is not a litigation surplus, but a litigation deficit”).
68. Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘I’ll See You in Court’, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2008, at A.1.
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securities violators less than 30% of the time.69 These studies do not
reveal why it is we so rarely sue. In behavioral terms, three possibilities
are: that we have internalized an obligational norm against litigation70
(such as the one shared by some Lutheran denominations that was the
impetus for the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the ministerial
exception to Title VII),71 that we do not want to appear litigious,72 or
that our decision to sue is affected by some form of status quo bias.73
Whatever the reason for litigant self-selection, what matters for
present purposes is that it plays a much reduced role in that subset of
cases where suit can be brought by class action. Theoretically, because
suing is a passive rather than an active decision under the class action
procedure,74 the behavioral considerations that might normally motivate
self-selection—be they normative, reputational, or fueled by status quo
bias—are circumvented by the class mechanism. Normative and
reputational considerations can be reduced when an act is passive rather

69. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip through Your Fingers: Empirical
Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities
Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 428 (2004). The authors of the study explain this
surprisingly low rate as the result of a desire on the part of those who head investment institutions not to
be seen as joining the plaintiff’s lawyers in suing a common enemy. After all, those who work at public
investment institutions often later seek work in the private sector working for the very same companies
that are usually defendants in large securities cases. Noting that no institutional investor has ever agreed
to be a lead plaintiff in a securities class action, Cox & Thomas explain that:
The same social and commercial forces that prevents banks, mutual funds, and insurance
companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also weaken the commitment
of their managers to assure the firm reaps the full advantage of securities class action
litigation.
Id. at 428.
70. An “obligational norm” is a “rule[] or practice[] that actors not only self-consciously adhere
to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or engage in, although (by hypothesis) the
rule or practice is neither a legal nor an organizational rule.” In such a case “a departure from the norm
is likely to involve either self-criticism or criticism by others.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999).
71. See Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
72. For a discussion of the desire of some patients not to signal litigiousness to their doctors in
Matthew J.B. Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement:
Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 870–73 (2009).
73. The tendency of people to favor the “status quo” in making decisions is well established, but
the mechanism behind this tendency, and the mechanism by which people come to perceive a state of
affairs to be the “status quo,” is not so well established. See A. Nicolle et al., A regret-induced statusquo bias, 31 J. Neurosci. 3320 (2011) (discussing possible explanations for status quo bias, positing and
evaluating one hypothesis).
74. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1615 (2003). Redish and Larsen argue that opt-out
class treatment violates the stakeholder’s due process right—a stakeholder who simply does not opt out
of a class could lose her stake as a result of the passive decision (or lack thereof) not to opt out. They do
not reach the pleading issues discussed in this Article.
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than active,75 and status quo bias may encourage rather than discourage
litigation when the class action device is utilized—because a plaintiff
must affirmatively opt-out in order to prevent his suit from being
brought.76 If this reasoning holds, we would expect the lawsuit rate to
increase dramatically when suit is brought via the class action
mechanism.
This theoretical projection is consistent with studies of actual litigant
behavior, which show across the board that the rate at which individuals
participate in an opt-out class action is nearly 100%.77 While only a
fraction of injured patients would sue in Patient v. Bayer, all injured
patients save a few who opt-out would be part of the class action in
Patient v. Acme.
2. Federal Rule 23 and the Costs and Benefits of Pleading
Does the categorical effect of class treatment on lawsuit rates alter the
costs and benefits of allowing a suit into court? Yes, as discussed
below.
a. Outcome-independent Costs
At least according to popular perception, the primary driver of
outcome-independent costs in litigation is discovery cost.
The
relationship between the discovery cost aspect of the pleading equation
and the class mechanism has been subject to scholarly attention. In The
Plaintiff Neutrality Principle, in addition to analyzing plausibility
pleading as applied to allegations regarding Plaintiff (and potential
Plaintiff) conduct, Professor Effron argues that class actions should not
75. See Lawrence, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. at 870–71.
76. The possibility that status quo bias could be at play in the decision to sue and affected by
class certification has been pointed out elsewhere by Professors Issacharoff and Geoffrey Miller, though
not in so many words. Speaking of the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out procedure they said:
In the case of opt-outs, the path of inertia—doing nothing—also is the path of rationality.
It is nearly always in the class member’s interest not to opt-out of class cases. If the class
member opts out he gains virtually nothing but loses the right to participate in whatever
benefit the class litigation may generate—a small benefit, perhaps, but still one that
confers some value. Conversely, if the class member does nothing, he loses nothing
other than an essentially worthless right to bring his own lawsuit, but gains the right to
participate in the proceeds of the class litigation. A rational class member will not optout.
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 179 (2009).
77. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1549 (2004) (reporting trivial
opt-out rate).
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be subject to greater scrutiny in evaluating plausibility, because class
treatment does not increase discovery cost.78 Professor Effron’s analysis
is not complete, because it does not adequately incorporate three
litigation considerations that, by virtue of the categorical effect of class
treatment discussed above, do cause class treatment to increase
discovery cost. In light of these considerations, while discovery cost
necessarily varies a great deal from case to case, we should theoretically
expect discovery to be categorically more costly in class actions than it
is in individually-filed suits, all else being equal.
First, Professor Effron suggests that class actions can reduce
discovery costs because, when multiple actions are consolidated in a
single class action, redundant discovery for each suit need not be
duplicated. Even assuming the premise is true—that those who opt out
of class actions do not seek their own independent and costly discovery,
undermining the efficiency benefits of class treatment—as Professor
Effron recognizes, coordinated discovery is not just possible without
class treatment, but routine. Even where class treatment is unavailable,
individually-filed lawsuits that share “one or more common questions of
fact” (a more easily met test than Rule 23’s requirement that common
questions “predominate”) can be consolidated in a single court for
coordinated discovery by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
regardless where they are filed.79 Using this process, a judge “need not
rely on the class action, with its demanding requirements, to achieve the
benefits of aggregation.”80 Therefore, there is no reason to believe that
class actions create a significant efficiency benefit as compared to other
formal (or informal) means of coordinating discovery.
Second, Professor Effron’s analysis does not address the fact that, as
discussed above, the class action significantly increases the stakes of a
lawsuit by increasing the number of suits at issue in an action. This has
direct implications for discovery because the rules that govern discovery
include a proportionality requirement: when a defendant opposes
discovery because it would be “burdensome,” the court inquires whether
the requested discovery is likely to be worth the expense pursuant to
Federal Rule 26(b)(2). Specifically, the court asks whether “the burden
of expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
78. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the era of
Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2028–40 (2010).
79. See generally Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a
Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008).
80. Id.; see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, NYU School of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 09-09; Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008).
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resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”81
So it is that as the stakes goes up, the extent to which additional
discovery is warranted goes up as well. The more Acme stands to lose
in a lawsuit, the more a court should require Acme to do in order
produce potentially relevant evidence to the patient, according to
Federal Rule 26(b)(2).
Finally, and relatedly, Professor Effron’s analysis does not address
the fact that a defendant’s incentive to litigate discovery—rather than
just turn over any requested documents—depends in large part upon the
magnitude of the defendant’s exposure should discovery turn up a
smoking gun. “[D]iscovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but
also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter.”82
Institutional defendants—or, more specifically, their in-house and hired
counsel—often do not know what discovery will uncover unless and
until they take the time to review the documents they have agreed to
produce. Hence the term “fishing expedition.”83 As a result,
“[c]ompanies are willing to invest more in cases where the stakes
are . . . high.”84 Again, because class treatment increases the stakes of
litigation, it increases the incentive to litigate discovery and, therefore,
expected discovery costs, all else being equal.
b. Outcome-dependent Costs
As for outcome-dependent costs, Federal Rule 23 increases the risk of
false positives associated with allowing a suit to proceed past the
pleading stage by increasing the likelihood that a defendant who has not
violated the law will be forced into a settlement in order to avoid even a
very small risk of a massive judgment. This threat has been recognized
almost since the rule’s inception. Harry Friendly first described the
phenomenon in 1972, famously calling many class settlements
“blackmail settlements.” Richard Nagareda explored this concern and
disaggregated two reasons innocent defendants are more likely to settle
lawsuits brought as class actions than individually-filed suits: the
“addition effect” (the fact that class treatment increases the total number
of claims brought against the defendant) and the “amplification effect”
(the possibility that by clumping all suits into one all-or-nothing lawsuit,
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
82. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
83. E.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
84. Emery G. Lee, III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765 (2010).
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class treatment is especially onerous to risk-averse defendants).85 Even
if Acme is completely blameless, the sheer magnitude of the potential
liability may cause it to a settle a class action—to avoid a companybusting judgment—where Dr. Bayer (or rather his insurer) can litigate
individual suits notwithstanding the possibility that he might lose one or
two.
c. Outcome-dependent Benefits
Turning to the benefits of class treatment, there is intuitive reason to
believe that class actions, by increasing the lawsuit rate categorically, do
more to advance the underlying substantive law than individually-filed
suits. Indeed, according to some normative economic theories of the
tort system, at least, a close to 100% lawsuit rate is optimal because that
is the rate necessary to achieve optimal enforcement.86
Normative economic theories notwithstanding, whether increasing
enforcement of substantive law above the default, individual-filing rate
for claims subject to class treatment is actually consistent with the
purposes of the underlying substantive law is in fact a difficult question
that depends in large part upon the law itself. As stated, “[n]ot all
substantive principles necessarily warrant enforcement to the nth
degree.”87 Indeed, some have argued that Congress creates private
rights of action under the assumption that lawsuits will be brought only
occasionally—not whenever they are profitable—and that bringing such
actions as class actions in fact frustrates the legislative bargain struck in
the statute.88
Statutes that provide for statutory damages, such as treble damages,
are a good example of the fact that Congress does not always intend that
people will sue whenever they believe they have suffered a legal wrong.
Allowing these actions to proceed as class actions can not only frustrate
the purposes of the underlying law,89 but can lead to absurd results90 and
85. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, ClassWide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006).
86. See generally Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
87. Richard Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885 (2006) (describing “‘the Javert problem’: the
possibility that aggregation might amount to a rigid, literalistic insistence upon substantive law in all its
details akin to that exhibited by the police inspector in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables”).
88. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–80 (2003).
89. Richard Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1878 (2006) (“Aggregation of statutory
damages . . . would make for a kind of double counting discordant with the underlying remedial
scheme.”).
90. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and
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perhaps even violate due process.91 For instance, the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) provides statutory damages where a
business includes certain credit card information on its receipts. In
combination with the increase in the participation rate where a suit is
subject to class treatment, the resulting damages can become ludicrous
for businesses with many customers. One such class action against the
pizza restaurant Chuck E. Cheese sought damages of $1.9 billion; the
company had only earned $68 million the year before.92 It is difficult to
say that this result furthered the underlying values of the FACTA.93
Furthermore, by increasing the magnitude of liability for claims
subject to class treatment, the device increases the likelihood that such a
claim will be brought at all. As a result, for claims that would otherwise
be “negative value”—not worth bringing, at least in monetary terms—
class treatment can affect not just the degree to which substantive law
goals are furthered (be they compensation, retribution, or deterrence),
but also whether these goals are realized at all. This is another way in
which class treatment may do more to further the outcome-dependent
benefits of suing.
d. Outcome-independent Benefits
Finally, the primary outcome-independent benefit of letting suits into
court—the court access value—is unaffected by class treatment, because
the additional plaintiffs brought into court by the class action
mechanism have not sought judicial vindication in the same sense as a
plaintiff who actually wants to sue. Absent a plaintiff demanding
justice, the right to a “day in court” loses any meaning it has
independent of advancing the compensation, deterrence, or retribution
goals of substantive law. Indeed, rhetoric articulating the access value
presumes an active litigant,94 and at least one rationale for the access
value is completely absent where a lawsuit comes to court as part of a
class action. Courts and commentators have explained that access is a
value because the civil justice system provides an alternative to violence
Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103 (2009) (“Combining the litigation incentives of statutory damages
and the class action in one suit, however, creates the potential for absurd liability and over-deterrence.”).
91. See J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing:
The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 525 (2004); cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD.
L. REV. 409, 454 n.225 (2005).
92. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and
Class Actions, 74 MISSOURI L. REV. 106 (2009).
93. Id.
94. E.g. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275 (2004)
(“Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication processes.”).
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through which citizens can resolve disputes in a way that is legitimate
even to the loser. But, there is no need for courts to play that role when
the plaintiff in a case did not choose to bring suit.
B. The Pleading Threshold for Class Actions Should Be Different
A brief recap of the preceding Part: class actions categorically
increase both the outcome-independent and the outcome-dependent
costs of letting suits into court; they have no categorical impact on the
outcome-independent benefit of letting suits in; and, they may or may
not categorically increase the outcome-dependent benefits of letting
suits in, depending on what the crafters of the substantive law at issue in
a particular case had in mind. In short—a mixed bag.
1. Policy Recommendation: A Different Pleading Threshold
The foregoing analysis does not show that, as a matter of policy,
pleading should serve a gate-keeping function at all, in class actions or
otherwise.95 Furthermore, the foregoing analysis does not show that, if
pleading should keep some cases out of court, the threshold for class
actions should be more stringent than the threshold for individually-filed
suits, and it does not show that the threshold for class actions should be
less stringent. But it does show that, because class actions categorically
pose a different mix of pleading costs and benefits, the pleading
threshold, if there is one, should be different for class actions.96
95. For an argument on this front, see, e.g., Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2010).
96. Professor Effron suggests that it may be appropriate to address any special burdens imposed
by class actions at class certification, not the pleading stage, Effron, supra note 78, at 2041–44, but it is
not apparent that such an approach is preferable. Conceptually, gate keeping does not fit squarely into
the class certification decision as it does into pleading: the class certification inquiry is designed to
ensure that the interests of absentee plaintiffs will adequately be represented and that class treatment
would be efficient, not to perform a gatekeeping merits determination. Practically, class certification
simply happens too late to forestall many of the costs that gatekeeping at the pleading stage is
apparently intended to avoid, as Professor Effron recognizes. Id. at 2042. In most cases, by the time the
class issue is joined extensive discovery will have taken place, a trend that should only increase since
the Supreme Court married class certification and the merits in Wal Mart v. Dukes, and because
certification is often tantamount to victory for the Plaintiffs, settlement will often already have occurred.
E.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class
Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 106, 107 (2009); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A
New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1003 n.12 (2005). Furthermore, it
is entirely feasible to consider the fact of potential class treatment at the motion to dismiss stage,
because class allegations not included in the initial complaint must be added by amendment later, and
may not relate back to the initial complaint. See D.C. CT. R. 23.1 (2012) (requiring that allegations in
support of class treatment be included in complaint); Leal v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., No. M-09-228,
2009 WL 4852670, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009) (class allegations added via amended complaint can
create new removal window under the Class Action Fairness Act); see also Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534
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Whether these differences warrant a more or less stringent pleading
standard for class actions depends, ultimately, upon two policy
judgments: (1) whether a higher lawsuit rate in fact does more to serve
the purposes of the underlying substantive law; and, (2) whether and to
what extent any such boost in the advancement of substantive law
values associated with class treatment outweighs the corresponding
increase in the burdens of class litigation.97 As explained in the next
Part, the Federal Rules, the history of Twombly, and the Supreme
Court’s other pleading case law reflect answers to these two questions
that courts must take into account in applying Federal Rule 8. As a
result, courts interpreting Rule 8 (and therefore applying Twombly),
should apply a relatively more stringent pleading threshold to class
actions than they do to individually-filed actions.
2. Rule 8 Recommendation: A More Stringent Pleading Rule
As elaborated upon below, courts interpreting Federal Rule 8 should
apply a more stringent “plausibility” requirement to damages class
actions for three reasons.98 First, there is reason to believe that the fact
that Twombly was a class action influenced the Supreme Court’s
application of the standard in that case. Second, the Supreme Court’s
contemporaneous pleading decisions also reflect a more searching eye
toward class actions at the pleading stage. Third, the one possible
benefit of class treatment (for pleading purposes) that could outweigh
the increased burdens they put on the system—advancement of
substantive law—is an improper consideration in interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8.99
F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) (“To maintain a class action, the existence of the class must be
pleaded . . . .”).
97. Some might not subscribe to the access value and think lawsuits have no transaction benefit.
Others might think that by inflating lawsuit rates over where they would be absent the mechanism, class
actions always frustrate congressional intent.
98. Professor Effron discusses the possibility of singling out the class allegations of a complaint,
treating a motion to dismiss such allegations separately from a motion to dismiss the named plaintiff's
allegations in support of his or her own claim. Effron, supra note 78, at 2051–56. To the extent that a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) may permissibly draw such a distinction between class
claims and individual claims, the analysis here counsels subjecting the class allegations to a more
stringent pleading threshold than the allegations of the named Plaintiff in support of his or her own
claims.
99. Courts are not precluded from holding certain types of actions to a more demanding
“plausibility” threshold by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993). That case held that courts may not create pleading standards other than that
provided in Rule 8 to govern certain substantive areas. See id. at 168–69 (requiring specificity in
pleading cases of a certain subject matter “is a result which must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”). This Article does not advocate a
different pleading standard for class actions, like the particularity requirement that governs certain
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a. Twombly’s Procedural History Indicates the Supreme Court
Considered its Class Status
First, the procedural history of Twombly itself suggests that the fact
that it was a class action influenced the Supreme Court’s application of
the plausibility standard in that case. Twombly was a massive would-be
class action; the complaint alleged that various telephone carriers had
categorically and almost imperceptibly overcharged their customers for
several years, resulting in hundreds of millions in aggregate damages,
and sought to bring suit on behalf of every injured customer. The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint at the earliest possible
stage—long before the court had adjudicated the question of class
certification, any discovery had been conducted, or defendants had even
answered the allegations of the complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6), the defendants argued the complaint was
not even serious enough to require a response, let alone judicial
resolution.100
The plaintiffs in Twombly argued that at the pleading stage Federal
Rule 8 requires only that the complaint say enough to give the defendant
notice of the nature of the claim, which their complaint did. For
support, they pointed to a long line of cases from the Supreme Court and
elsewhere. For example, they quoted Conley v. Gibson for the
proposition that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”101
Defendants disagreed that notice was enough. They argued to the
Second Circuit that the necessary showing was in fact more stringent,
and that some gate-keeping at the pleading stage was necessary in light
of the likely burden of litigating the class action, as well as the sheer
magnitude of liability that defendants could face in such a large class
action.102 The Second Circuit rejected those arguments, holding that the
actions under Federal Rule 9. Rather, it advocates that the stringency of the governing “plausibility”
standard be different for class actions. Iqbal held that the “plausibility” standard applies in all civil
actions, but it did not say that the standard applies with the same level of rigor. But see W. Penn
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal made clear that Rule 8’s
pleading standard applies with the same level of rigor in ‘all civil actions.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) (emphasis omitted)). This approach is not unprecedented; courts have consistently
held that the pleading threshold for pro se actions should be less stringent than that applicable to other
actions, see infra Part IV(A). See also Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010), amended
and superseded on other grounds, 627 F.3d 338 (2010) (“[B]ecause Iqbal incorporated the Twombly
pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, we continue to construe
pro se filings liberally.”). Just as courts put a thumb on the scales in favor of pro se actions when
applying Rule 8, courts can (and should) put a thumb on the scales against class actions in this context.
100. Brief for Petitioner at 13–14, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005).
101. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
102. Id.
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defendants actually sought recalibration of the pleading standard in light
of the burdens they had identified and that such recalibration was
beyond its competence:
We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on one side of
that balance is the sometimes colossal expense of undergoing discovery,
that such costs themselves likely lead defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle
what would ultimately be shown to be meritless claims, that the success
of such meritless claims encourages others to be brought, and that the
overall result may well be a burden on the courts and a deleterious effect
on the manner in which and efficiency with which business is conducted.
If that balance is to be re-calibrated, however, it is Congress or the
Supreme Court that must do so.103

Defendants accepted the Second Circuit’s invitation and took their
case to the Supreme Court, where they again argued that Rule 8 should
play a gate-keeping role by requiring a plaintiff do more than notify a
defendant of the nature of her claim in order to access federal court.
Plaintiffs, for their part, again argued to the contrary, and again pointed
to a long line of precedent holding that notice alone is enough.
This time the defendants were successful. They argued to the
Supreme Court that mere notice was not enough because “the costs and
burdens imposed by meritless litigation—particularly class action
litigation, where plaintiffs have no risk of counterclaims or harm to
business and where discovery burdens are borne almost exclusively by
defendants—are too well documented to require or to allow great
elaboration here.”104 These burdens are especially pronounced in the
class context, they argued, because “[i]f a plaintiff can secure
certification of a class—even if the underlying case is without merit—
the pressure to settle (like the potential fee award to the class action
lawyer) becomes enormous.” Rigorous gate-keeping at the pleading
stage, they explained, was necessary to curb speculative suits seeking
only to extract a settlement.105
The Supreme Court agreed. The long line of precedent holding that
notice is enough was incorrect, it held, and had always been.106 A
liberal notice-pleading rule would allow prospective plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits even though their case was at best speculative, the Court
explained, just to bully defendants into a settlement.107 Rather, it
103. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
104. Reply Brief for Petitioners, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2006), 2006 WL
3265610, *13–14.
105. Id. at *14–15.
106. 550 U.S. at 562–63.
107. 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases.”).
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reminded courts that, “a district court must retain the power to insist
upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive
factual controversy to proceed.”108 Applying the newly-announced
“plausibility” standard to the case before it, the Court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim.109 The Court’s heavy emphasis on
the class action features of the Twombly complaint and the defendants’
explicit reliance upon Twombly’s status as a would-be class action in
making their case to the Court provide reason to believe the Court
considered this fact about the case in doing so.
b. The Supreme Court’s Contemporaneous Decisions Indicate a More
Stringent Threshold for Class Actions
Second, interpreting Twombly’s plausibility standard to require more
in the class action context in light of the greater burdens class actions
pose explains what is otherwise a perplexing inconsistency in the
Supreme Court’s recent pleading jurisprudence. In five recent pleading
decisions, the Supreme Court has appeared somewhat schizophrenic
about the stringency of the showing required by Rule 8(a). In
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema110 and Erickson v. Pardus,111 the Court reversed
the Second and Tenth Circuits, respectively, faulting them for applying a
too-stringent pleading standard, even though the complaints at issue
were relatively sparse. But, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,112
Twombly, and Iqbal, it held that the complaints had not made the
necessary showing, even though the allegations therein were somewhat
detailed.
The Ninth Circuit recently expressed confusion regarding the state of
the law after these five cases:
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz and Erickson, on the one hand, and
Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal, on the other, is perplexing. Even though the
Court stated in all five cases that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading
standard in Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal. . . . To the extent that we perceive
a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups of cases, it is
difficult to know in cases that come before us whether we should apply
the more lenient or the more demanding standard.113

The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its confusion, commentators have
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
551 U.S. 89 (2007).
544 U.S. 336 (2005).
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011).
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noticed this apparent disconnect, as well.114
Swierkiewicz and Erickson were run-of-the-mill individually-filed
lawsuits brought by an employee against his employer and a prisoner
against his prison, respectively. But Dura and Twombly were both large
class actions.115 That the Supreme Court seemed to demand more of the
complaints in the latter two cases should come as no surprise, then,
because as explained above class actions should be subject to a different
standard. Following the teaching of the Supreme Court in Dura,
Twombly, Swierkiewicz, and Erickson, that standard should be more
stringent than the one applicable to ordinary lawsuits. (As for Iqbal, the
reason the complaint in that case failed to meet the plausibility threshold
is beyond the scope of this paper, but others have explained at length
why that case, although not a class action, was far from ordinary.116)
Indeed, as discussed above, the petitioners in Twombly focused
specifically on the burdens of class treatment in advocating for the
pleading rule the Supreme Court adopted, and the Court appeared
sympathetic to those arguments.117
Put in concrete terms, Twombly stated that a complaint’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”118 Whether a claim for relief is speculative or not can depend,
quite naturally, on the breadth of the relief sought. Factual allegations
that suffice to render plausible the patient’s claim for individual relief in
Patient v. Bayer might not suffice to raise a claim for class-wide relief in
Patient v. Acme.
c. Advancement of Substantive Law is an Inappropriate Consideration
in Interpreting Rule 8
Third, it is inappropriate for a court interpreting Rule 8, be it the
114. E.g. Bone, supra note 24, at 873.
115. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (noting the “potential expense is obvious enough . . . plaintiffs
represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or high speed
Internet service in the continental United States, in an action against America’s largest
telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes of
business records) for unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a
period of seven years”).
116. See Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215 (2010).
117. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2006), 2006
WL 3265610, *13–16. (“[T]he costs and burdens imposed by meritless litigation—particularly class
action litigation, where plaintiffs have no risk of counterclaims or harm to business and where discovery
burdens are borne almost exclusively by defendants—are too well documented to require or to allow
great elaboration.”) (emphasis added); see also id. (“If a plaintiff can secure certification of a class—
even if the underlying case is without merit—the pressure to settle (like the potential fee award to the
class action lawyer) becomes enormous.”).
118. 550 U.S. at 555.
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Supreme Court or any other, to consider the only expected benefit of the
class mechanism that potentially offsets its increased costs, i.e., class
treatment’s potential to do more to advance substantive law. Although
Congress may certainly consider substantive law values in regulating the
courts, the courts themselves may not. Rather, the Rules Enabling Act,
which is the basis for both Federal Rule 8 and Federal Rule 23, does not
grant authority to “abridge, enlarge, or modify” substantive rights.
Therefore, in interpreting and applying Federal Rule 8, the only policy
considerations properly considered by courts are considerations that
relate to procedure qua procedure.119
This is made explicit by Federal Rule 1, which announces the factors
to be considered in interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule explains the Federal Rules “should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” Unlike whether an interpretation will
lead to the “just” and “inexpensive” determination of an action, whether
a particular way of construing the rules will best advance the particular
substantive law upon which a claim is premised is not a listed
consideration. Indeed, consideration of substantive law values in
interpreting rules of procedure would run directly contrary to the
principle of transubstantivity underlying the Federal Rules.120
As explained above, the possibility that class actions do more to
further substantive law values is the only potential benefit that counsels
against applying a more stringent pleading standard to such actions. As
a result, because that consideration is itself improper in interpreting Rule
8, the standard set forth in that rule, which Twombly interpreted to
include a “plausibility requirement,” should be relatively more stringent
when it is applied to class actions than when it is applied to individuallyfiled suits.
Furthermore, even if advancement of substantive law were a proper
consideration in interpreting a federal rule, it is not the sort of clear,
categorical benefit that should obviously be considered in applying the
pleading rule. That is because, as discussed above, whether class
treatment in fact advances the substantive law at issue in a particular
case is case-dependent and highly debatable. Consideration of this
potential effect would force every court applying the pleading rule to a
new area of law to preside over the parties’ inevitable dispute about the

119. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885 (2006) (“[T]here is no authority in
the hands of courts charged with the administration of aggregate procedure somehow to select which
features of substantive law to temper.”).
120. Cf. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010).
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meaning and purpose of the substantive law at issue, in order to
determine whether Congress would or would not have intended for suits
to be brought en masse. The expense of litigating this issue—in terms
of both time and cost—would likely (though not inevitably) exceed the
benefits.
d. Calibrating the stringency of the pleading standard based on context
is not unprecedented
Application of a more stringent standard to certain cases based upon
their procedural posture is not unprecedented. The Supreme Court has
explicitly shown a willingness to tailor the pleading standard in light of
categorical differences among case types. In Pardus the Court stated
that pleadings brought pro se “must be held to less stringent
standards.”121 So understood, while Iqbal makes clear that the
“plausibility” requirement applies to all complaints, the stringency of
this standard can simply be heightened in the context of class action
complaints, just as it is lowered in the context of pro se complaints.
Indeed, the framer of the civil rules, Charles E. Clark, believed that the
showing required under Rule 8 itself can vary depending on context,122
and the draftsman of Rule 23, Edward Cooper, proposed a heightened
pleading rule for class actions.123
Furthermore, that class action complaints should be subject to closer
scrutiny is fully consistent with the “plausibility” standard, as articulated
by the Supreme Court and understood by both commentators124 and
courts.125 Indeed, numerous courts have suggested that the plausibility
standard of Twombly should apply only, or most stringently, in certain

121. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
122. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 282 (1942) (noting that
Rule 9, requiring allegations of fraud, inter alia, be plead with “particularity,” “probably states only
what courts would do anyhow.”).
123. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 962.
124. Spencer, supra note 37, at 35 (“[L]anguage from Twombly could support the idea that
pleading standards also vary depending upon a different kind of context than what we have been
discussing thus far: the complexity and prospective cost associated with litigating the claim. The
Twombly Court certainly made the cost of discovery relevant to its analysis and lower courts that are so
inclined may feel encouraged to do the same.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 36 (“Perhaps the most
significant source of optimism is that the concepts articulated by the Court are malleable enough to
enable federal judges to apply them in a manner consistent with systemic values other than cost and
efficiency.”); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008) (suggesting antitrust lawsuits should
be subject to a more stringent pleading standard, all else being equal).
125. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If
discovery is likely to be more than usually costly, the complaint must include as much factual detail and
argument as may be required to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim.”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/2

32

Lawrence: Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading Threshol

2013]

MORE STRINGENT PLEADINGS FOR CLASS ACTIONS

1257

contexts where closer scrutiny is warranted.126
Such an approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s
guidance. Although a number of cases and articles127 have attempted to
define precisely the nature of the “plausibility” inquiry required by
Twombly and Iqbal, Professor Noll has persuasively argued that the
truth is that all we can say for sure is that, whatever goes into
determining how “plausible” a claim is, and however “plausible” a
claim must be in order to satisfy Federal Rule 8, the standard was not
met by the complaints in Twombly or Iqbal.128 The Court itself said as
much in Iqbal, explaining that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”129 Therefore, for now the work
of elaborating upon both the content of the standard (what a court
considers in assessing “plausibility”) and its stringency (how “plausible”
a case must be in order to pass the threshold) falls first into the capable
hands of the district courts and courts of appeals. For the reasons set
forth above, courts should consider the fact that a case is brought as a
class action as a thumb on the scales against plausibility.
Finally, to the extent that decisions like Twombly and Iqbal have put
the “important values of civil litigation . . . in jeopardy” by
“subordinating” the day in court “to one-dimensional claims of
excessive litigation costs and abuse,”130 applying a relatively higher
pleading threshold to class actions represents a compromise position.
Such an approach mitigates many of the litigation costs that drove
Twombly and Iqbal, while preserving undiminished (or at the very least,
less diminished) the individual litigant’s ability to secure his day in
court.
126. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Courts in and out of the Sixth
Circuit have [indicated that Twombly’s] holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation
like that considered in Twombly.”); see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2012) (“[S]everal circuits have ruled that . . . the
degree of ‘plausibility’ that must be present in any given complaint . . . will depend on the context.”).
127. E.g. Bone, supra note 24, at 849 (relying on “inferences from the way the Court applies the
plausibility standard in [Twombly and Iqbal] and on contrasting language in the two opinions” to
extrapolate a definition of the “plausibility” standard); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even
After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010).
128. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L. REV. 117 (2010); see also Lonny
S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach
Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257 (2008) (“Virtually everyone
(except, perhaps, the five Justices in the majority in Twombly) regards plausibility as an ambiguous
standard.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 28 (“Given the expanded judicial scope of inquiry on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, is it now incumbent on a plaintiff to negate any and all potentially innocent
explanations for the defendant’s challenged conduct, a long-proscribed form of anticipatory pleading?”).
129. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
130. Miller, supra note 31.
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IV. OTHER CANDIDATES FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT
The mechanism by which a case comes to court is not the only fact
that alters the mix of costs and benefits of allowing the case past the
pleading stage. This Part discusses two other case facts that the
framework developed in Part II suggests should also be subject to a
different pleading threshold. First, courts have long recognized that
suits brought pro se should be subject to a lower pleading threshold.
Second, although not yet recognized by courts, cases challenging agency
action on the administrative record—such as Administrative Procedure
Act cases—should also be subject to a lower pleading threshold under
Twombly, because these cases systematically pose lower discovery
costs.
A. Pro Se Actions Are Already Subject to a Less Stringent Threshold
Federal courts have long applied a less-stringent pleading threshold to
lawsuits that are brought pro se. Indeed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this rule in Erickson v. Pardus, a case decided since Twombly.131 There,
the Court held that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”132 Or as Federal Practice and Procedure puts it, “[t]he
judicially created requirements for pleading under the rules are even less
stringent (although there are limits) when a party is litigating pro se.”133
The lower pleading threshold applied to pro se actions is fully
consistent with the framework set forth in Part II, above. A sustained
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but pro se cases feature one
categorical difference that could affect the mix of pleading benefits and
burdens they pose, namely, the plaintiff in a pro se case has been unable
(or perhaps unwilling) to secure counsel. As a result, pro se lawsuits
necessarily are brought solely by aggrieved persons who genuinely want
to bring a suit that is either not profitable or otherwise popular (and so
did not attract contingent-fee or pro bono legal representation). Judges
might reasonably believe that allowing such a case into court is more
likely to serve the access value.

131. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1215 (3d ed. 2012); see also id. at n.11 (collecting cases).
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B. Record Review Actions Should Be Subject to a Less Stringent
Threshold
Federal courts confronting Twombly-based motions to dismiss actions
for review of agency action on the administrative record have applied
the standard without comment.134 The framework set forth in Part II
suggests, however, that the fact that a complaint (or count of a
complaint) seeks review of agency action on the administrative record
should cause courts to apply a relatively less stringent pleading
requirement to that complaint (or count).
Record review actions are systematically different in that discovery is
not allowed in such a case (other than in certain rare and narrowlycircumscribed circumstances).135 Instead, in a record review case, the
agency compiles and files an administrative record that forms the
exclusive basis for the Court’s review.
An obvious implication of this difference for the costs and benefits of
letting a record review case into court is that the concerns about broad
and expensive discovery articulated in Twombly are all but nonexistent.
Indeed, a number of districts specifically exempt record review cases
from holding a pre-discovery conference under Federal Rule 16(f)
requirements in light of this fact.136 In light of the categorically lower
outcome-independent costs threatened by record review actions, the
pleading threshold applicable to such actions should be relatively less
stringent than that applicable to other actions.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no reason that a pleading rule designed to balance certain
costs and benefits should be blind to the fact that different case types
can pose a systematically different mix of costs and benefits. Quite to
the contrary, a pleading rule tailored to take this fact into account will
maximize the benefits of pleading while minimizing its costs, and
thereby best balance “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
134. See Pat Huval Restaurant & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 823 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1379 (C.I.T. 2012) (“In the absence of any factual allegations from which we otherwise could
conclude that either agency’s actions were violative of the APA, we conclude that the . . . Plaintiffs’
APA claim must be dismissed.”); Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235, 249 (Fed. Cl.
2009).
135. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“The reviewing court is not
generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own
conclusions based on such an inquiry.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for
judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.”).
136. E.g. D.C. CT. R. 16.3(b) (2012) (exempting from meet and confer requirements “an action
for review on an administrative record”).
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every action.”137 As the foregoing analysis shows, the pleading
threshold courts apply to class actions (and possibly pro se and record
review actions), should be different than the threshold applicable to
other types of actions. Indeed, it should be higher.

137. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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